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I. INTRODUCTION 
The number of migrants arriving to the European Union since the start of the 
migration crisis in 2014 and the death toll of persons attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea1 during that time have provoked many debates about, inter 
alia, the fundamental rights of asylum seekers in Europe. Questions about the 
fairness and effectiveness of the Common European Asylum System ('CEAS') 
have repeatedly been raised.2 
This article analyses the scope of the judgments of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter 'Court of Justice' or 'CJEU') on the protection 
of fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers.3 The evaluation of the 
                                                 
1 Current data can be found in International Organization for Migration, 'Migration 
Flows - Europe' <http://migration.iom.int/europe/> accessed 2 October 2018. 
2 See further Jenny Ritter and others, 'Introduction. European Perspective and 
National Discourses on the Migrant Crisis' in Melani Barlai and others (eds), The 
Migrant Crisis: European Perspectives and National Discourses (LIT-Verlag 2017) 13–
20. 
3 The CJEU decisions and Advocates General's Opinions were available on CURIA 
<www.curia.europa.eu> accessed 25 August 2018, and the European Court of 
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CJEU's contribution to a common European understanding of human rights 
(a so-called ius commune europaeum) takes into account the frequency and 
quality of the Court's references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (hereinafter 'the Charter' or 'CFREU'),4 the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('ECHR'),5 the 
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol ('Refugee Convention'),6 and the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights ('ECtHR'). This topic has been widely discussed in the 
academic literature.7 However, an update or revaluation of the case law is 
justified by the ever growing number of CJEU judgments on asylum issues.8 
Although some of the decisions have already been analysed by scholars,9 in 
the publications currently available researchers have primarily scrutinised 
detailed aspects of EU asylum law e.g. a right to a legal remedy in the Dublin 
procedure.10 In contrast, in this article 'asylum policy' is understood in its 
                                                 
Human Rights judgments were available on <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int> accessed 
25 August 2018. 
4 Consolidated version [2016] OJ C202/389. 
5 ETS No. 5. 
6 189 UNTS 137 and 606 UNTS 267. 
7 Cf. Sílvia Morgades-Gil, 'The Discretion of States in the Dublin III System for 
Determining Responsibility for Examining Applications for Asylum: What 
Remains of the Sovereignty and Humanitarian Clauses After the Interpretations 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU?' (2015) 27 International Journal of Refugee Law 433, 
433–456; Sara Iglesias Sánchez, 'Fundamental Rights Protection for Third Country 
Nationals and Citizens of the Union: Principles for Enhancing Coherence' (2013) 
15 European Journal of Migration and Law 137, 137–153; Jasper Krommendijk, 'The 
Use of ECtHR Case Law by the Court of Justice after Lisbon: The View of 
Luxembourg Insiders' (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 812, 812–835.  
8 Between 1 January 2015 and 15 September 2017, the CJEU closed 21 cases focusing 
on 'asylum policy'. Since then up until 14 November 2018, the CJEU has issued 11 
judgments on asylum issues. CURIA (n 4). 
9 Case C-63/15 Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie 
EU:C:2016:409 and Case C-155/15 George Karim v Migrationsverket EU:C:2016:410 
are exceptional as they were commented in Maarten den Heijer, 'Remedies in the 
Dublin Regulation: Ghezelbash and Karim' (2017) 54 Common Market Law 
Review 859. 
10 Heijer (n 9). The Dublin procedure is regulated in Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
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holistic meaning. It therefore applies to all issues starting from the 
submission of an asylum application to the moment when a decision on 
granting or rejecting asylum becomes final.11 As such, it encompasses 
different rights available to asylum seekers e.g. to submit an asylum 
application, to appeal a decision denying asylum, and to have an asylum 
interview. Due to the impact of the CJEU's decisions on the member states' 
laws and practices, this analysis contributes to the discussion on the 
relationship between the effet utile of EU law and the protection of 
fundamental rights. 
A critical evaluation of its recent judgments shows that the Court of Justice 
has recognised the importance of the Refugee Convention within the 
CEAS.12 However, the CJEU has not established a consistent practice of 
referring to that Convention. Hopes that the CJEU will progressively 
develop the protection of rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention13 have 
so far not materialised. The scope of the rights secured by the CFREU 
(which, according to Article 52(3) of the Charter, have the same meaning and 
scope as those in the ECHR) has also rarely been investigated by the Court 
of Justice.14 The principle that the ECHR represents a minimum standard of 
                                                 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] OJ L180/31 
(hereinafter 'the Dublin III Regulation'). 
11 See Article 78 of the 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47. 
12 Case C-443/14 Kreis Warendorf v Ibrahim Alo and Amira Osso v Region Hannover 
EU:C:2016:127, para 29, Case C-573/14 Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux 
apatrides v Mostafa Lounani EU:C:2017:71, para 42, Case C-560/14 M. v Minister for 
Justice and Equality, Ireland, Attorney General EU:C:2017:101, para 22. 
13 Roland Bank, 'The Potential and Limitations of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Shaping International Refugee Law' (2015) 27 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 213, 213. 
14 M. (n 12) paras 30-33, Case C-348/16 Moussa Sacko v Commissione Territoriale per il 
riconoscimento della protezione internazionale di Milano EU:C:2017:591, para 32 and 
Case C-578/16 PPU C.K., H.F., A.S. v Republika Slovenija EU:C:2017:127 are 
exceptional in this regard. However, the Charter applies only to issues which are 
'within the meaning and scope of EU law'. 
2019} A Safe Harbour or a Sinking Ship? 33 
 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU was established by the CJEU to 
limit the analysis of the rights guaranteed by the CFREU.15 Those rare and 
limited references to international human rights law (including the ECHR, 
as interpreted by the ECtHR) confirm that the Court of Justice still focuses 
primarily on the autonomy of EU law, insufficiently integrating this special 
legal regime into other branches of international law. This fundamentally 
limits the CJEU's contribution to the ius commune europaeum. 
In certain areas, however, EU law and the Court of Justice's decisions provide 
for the protection of more precise and specific rights in comparison to the 
Refugee Convention or the ECHR. Some CJEU decisions may therefore set 
an example to other courts, including the ECtHR, particularly on issues such 
as the possibility of questioning the legality of intergovernmental 
cooperation, specific timeframes for permissible detentions, an obligation to 
issue a decision rejecting the examination of subsequent asylum applications, 
and the impact of the receiving country's actions on the efficiency of 
guarantees of persons subjected to the Dublin procedure. 
Although the Court of Justice increasingly upholds fundamental rights, it 
does not do so consistently. Examples of decisions favouring member states' 
interests over the rights of asylum seekers can be found in judgments focusing 
on the arrival of exceptionally large numbers of migrants. These judgments 
focus on literal interpretations of EU law, favouring mutual trust over the 
individual's right to an effective remedy.16 They also lack consistency with the 
standard set by the ECtHR. Due to the importance of the challenges 
associated with an unprecedented number of migrant arrivals, recalling that 
also non-EU state parties to the ECHR (inter alia, countries covered by the 
EU neighbourhood policy) are affected with the migration crisis, these 
judgments question the ius commune europaeum. 
This article consists of five parts. The presentation of the methodology of 
selection of the CJEU judgments (section II) is followed by concise 
                                                 
15 Cf. Case C-239/14 Abdoulaye Amadou Tall v Centre public d'action sociale de Huy 
(CPAS de Huy) EU:C:2015:824, Ghezelbash (n 9), Case C-18/16 K. v Staatssecretaris 
van Veiligheid en Justitie EU:C:2017:680, and Mousa Sacko (n 14). 
16 Cf. Case C-646/16 Khadija Jafari, Zainab Jafari v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und 
Asyl EU:C:2017:586 and Case C-695/15 PPU Shiraz Baig Mirza v Bevándorlási és 
Állampolgársági Hivatal EU:C:2016:188. 
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reflections on the coherence between the Council of Europe ('CoE') and the 
EU's standards of protection of human rights (section III). The CJEU's 
judgments are briefly presented in section IV. They are gathered in thematic 
sets in which cases are presented in chronological order to show the gradual 
development of fundamental rights. This section also analyses recent cases in 
light of earlier findings of scholars. Section V critically examines if the CJEU 
adequately protects the fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers, 
thereby contributing to the development of the ius commune europaeum. 
II. THE METHODOLOGY OF SELECTION OF THE CJEU JUDGMENTS 
A filtered search on the CURIA database shows that, between 1 January 2015 
and 15 September 2017 (the period with the highest inflow of asylum seekers 
to the EU),17 the CJEU closed 21 cases focusing on 'asylum policy'.18 In those 
cases, the Court referred to: the CFREU (eleven judgments); the Dublin III 
Regulation (ten cases), Directive 2013/32 and Council Directive 2005/85 on 
asylum procedures (five cases),19 Directive 2013/33 laying down standards for 
the reception of asylum applicants (five cases),20 and Council Directive 
2004/83 on minimum standards of qualification as refugees (one case).21 The 
Mass Influx Directive (Council Directive 2001/55)22 was cited once. Finally, 
                                                 
17 Eurostat, 'Asylum statistics' [April 2018] Statistics Explained <https://ec. 
europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics> accessed 14 
November 2018. 
18 CURIA (n 3). 
19 Four references to Directive 2013/32 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection [2013] OJ L180/60. Council Directive 2005/85 of 1 
December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L326/13 was cited once. 
20 Directive 2013/33 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
[2013] OJ L180/96. 
21 Council Directive 2004/83 of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted [2004] OJ L304/12. 
22 Council Directive 2001/55 of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
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'asylum policy' cases also concerned the Schengen Borders Code23 (two cases) 
and Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals (four cases).24  
This article will analyse the following judgments, listed in chronological 
order, made by the CJEU between 1 January 2015 and 15 September 2017, 
which referred to the above-cited regulations: Tall, Warendorf, Al Chodor,25 
J.N.,26 Mirza, Ghezelbash, Lounani, M., C.K., H.F., A.S., Daher Muse Ahmed,27 
Moussa Sacko, A.S.,28 Jafari, Mengesteab,29 Amayry,30 K, and Karim. The above-
mentioned cases have been chosen due to the fact that all of them were 
assigned the keyword 'asylum policy' by the CURIA and they were issued by 
the CJEU between 1 January 2015 and 15 September 2017. This research is 
thus based on the judgments issued during the period of the highest inflow of 
asylum seekers to the EU, namely 2015 and 2016. Additionally, it covers parts 
of 2017, as all asylum seekers should receive first-instance decisions in their 
cases, even if they submitted their applications by the end of December 2016 
(as, according to Directive 2013/32 asylum decision should, as a rule, be made 
within six months). The analysis focuses on all requests by interested member 
states for a preliminary ruling in asylum policy cases. Therefore, it cites those 
CJEU judgments that address the situation of countries concerned with the 
transit of migrants (both the Mediterranean countries and countries located 
on the Balkan migration route) and destination countries. 
                                                 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such 
persons and bearing the consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212/12. 
23 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2016] OJ L77/1. 
24 Directive 2008/115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L 348/98. 
25 Case C-528/15 Policie ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké 
policie v Salah Al Chodor, Ajlin Al Chodor, Ajvar Al Chodor ECLI:EU:C:2017:213. 
26 Case C-601/15 J.N. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie EU:C:2016:84. 
27 Case C-36/17 Daher Muse Ahmed v Bundesrepublik Deutschland EU:C:2017:273. 
28 Case C-490/16 A.S. v Republika Slovenija EU:C:2017:585. 
29 Case C-670/16 Tsegezab Mengesteab v Bundesrepublik Deutschland EU:C:2017:587. 
30 Case C-60/16 Mohammad Khir Amayry v Migrationsverket EU:C:2017:675. 
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Nevertheless, not all of the cases which the CJEU marked with a keyword 
'asylum policy' met the thematic criteria of this article.31 In two cases the 
referring national courts withdrew their requests for a preliminary ruling, 
which makes it impossible to analyse them as they were removed from the 
register of the Court of Justice.32 The Mossa Ouhrami case did not cite any 
asylum issues, but instead focused on the aforementioned Directive 2008/115. 
Finally, in Ovidiu-Mihăiţă Petrea, the Court of Justice's decision concerned 
the right of a Romanian citizen to exercise his freedom of movement, and 
therefore does not meet the thematic criteria of this article. Thus, four of the 
CJEU judgments – Max-Manuel Nianga, Seusen Sume, criminal proceedings 
against Mossa Ouhrami, and Ovidiu-Mihăiţă Petrea – could not be analysed. 
The case selection for this research is thus based on clearly defined criteria, 
namely the thematic scope and the time of making judgments. As such, the 
selected decisions of the Court of Justice constitute a reliable starting point 
for a comparative analysis, focusing on the CJEU's standard of protection of 
the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. A relatively large number of 
analysed judgments ensures a well-grounded examination of the Court of 
Justice's interpretation of these rights. The CJEU's respect for stare decisis33 
increases the reliability of the present article's findings. 
                                                 
31 To list the case law in a hronological order: C-445/14 Seusen Sume v Landkreis Stade 
EU:C:2015:314, Case C-199/16 Max-Manuel Nianga v État belge EU:C:2017:401, 
Case C-225/16 a criminal proceedings against Mossa Ouhrami EU:C:2017:590, Case C-
184/16 Ovidiu-Mihăiţă Petrea v Ypourgos Esoterikon kai Dioikitikis Anasygrotisis 
EU:C:2017:684. 
32 Max-Manuel Nianga and Seusen Sume. 
33 Marc Jacob, Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice: 
Unfinished Business (Cambridge University Press 2014); Pedro Caro de Sousa, 
'Negative and Positive Integration in EU Economic Law: Between Strategic 
Denial and Cognitive Dissonance' (2012) 13 German Law Journal 979, 1002. 
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III. EUROPEAN STANDARDS OF PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
1. The Development of Ius Commune Europaeum as a "Safe Harbour" 
Diversification and expansion of international law has resulted both in its 
fragmentation34 and specialisation.35 The identification of an adequate 
standard of protection of human rights is a complicated issue, particularly 
'when the wording and scope of the respective provisions contain subtle 
differences'.36 This explains why building a common understanding of human 
rights – a ius commune – is always a work in progress.37 It unveils conflicts 
between universal and regional systems of protection of human rights,38 
thereby 'strik[ing] at the heart of the principle of universality on which 
human rights rests, both legally and conceptually'.39 There are divergent views 
about all principal features of the ius commune. Nevertheless, 'the 
                                                 
34 International Law Commission, 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Eighth Session, 
Geneva, 1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006' 10. 
35 Ibid 17; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the 
"Fragmentation” of International Law' (2007) 2 European Journal of Legal Studies 
4. 
36 Peter Van Elsuwege, 'New Challenges for Pluralist Adjudication after Lisbon: The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in a Ius Commune Europaeum' (2012) 30 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 195, 212; Sergey Vasiliev, 'International 
Criminal Tribunals in the Shadow of Strasbourg and Politics of Cross-Fertilisation' 
(2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 371, 393. 
37 Michael De Salvia, 'L'Élaboration d'un "ius commune" de Droits de I'Homme et 
les Libertés Fondamentales dans la Perspective de l'Unité Européenne: L'oeuvre 
Accomplie par la Commission et la Cour Européennes des Droits de l'Homme' in 
Franz Matscher, Gérard J Wiarda and Herbert Petzold (eds), Protecting human 
rights: The European dimension: studies in honour of Gérard J. Wiarda = Protection des 
droits de l'homme: la dimension européenne (Heymanns 1988) 555–563. 
38 Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 219; Raghunandan Swarup Pathak, 
'Introductory Report' in Council of Europe (ed), Universality of human rights in a 
pluralistic world (Engel 1990) 5-17. 
39 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 'The European 
Union and International Human Rights Law' 8 <https://europe.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf> accessed 15 Novem-
ber 2018. 
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transnational and universal character of the discourse and the pervasive yet 
multifaceted relationship between the global discourse and local legal and 
political systems'40 also increases the visibility and coherence of human rights 
and, consequently, the efficiency of the protection of those rights. 
Although European values are often said to be imposed on non-European 
societies,41 identifying a common European standard is not without 
difficulty. The Council of Europe and the EU play important roles in the 
protection of human rights in Europe, but both institutions operate in very 
different legal, political, and factual contexts. Even though 'the EU may have 
to adhere to human rights obligations indirectly through the prior obligations 
of its Member States',42 EU law does 'not necessarily reflect the broader and 
deeper standards contained in UN instruments'43 and in the ECHR. For 'this 
complex interplay between overlapping and interdependent dimensions […] 
[to] not lead to a cacophony of divergent interpretations',44 a well-managed 
dialogue between the CJEU and the ECtHR is necessary. This could indeed 
increase the fairness and predictability of the decisions of the two courts,45 
both of which should strive towards 'the development of a harmonious 
European common law of fundamental rights'46 – a ius commune europaeum.  
To this end, it would help to identify general European trends in the 
interpretation of these rights, which ultimately would assist in achieving a 
common – albeit not unified – European understanding of human rights. 
This requires the strengthening of judicial dialogue, both horizontal (i.e. 
between European and national courts, and constitutional and regional 
                                                 
40 Paolo Carozza, 'My Friend Is a Stranger: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius 
Commune of Human Rights' (2003) 81 Texas Law Review 1031, 1077. 
41 Paivi Leino, 'A European Approach to Human Rights? Universality Explored' 
(2002) 71 Nordic Journal of International Law 455, 460. 
42 Tawhida Ahmed and Israel de Jesus Butler, 'The European Union and Human 
Rights: An International Law Perspective' (2006) 17 European Journal of 
International Law 771, 772. 
43 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (n 39) 8. 
44 Van Elsuwege (n 36) 197. 
45 Guy Harpaz, 'The European Court of Justice and Its Relations with the European 
Court of Human Rights: The Quest for Enhanced Reliance, Coherence and 
Legitimacy' [2009] Common Market Law Review 105, 109. 
46 Van Elsuwege (n 36) 197. 
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courts) and vertical (i.e. between European courts and constitutional 
courts).47 International judges are already aware of the need to build such a 
common European understanding of human rights.48 They strengthen the ius 
commune europaeum by 'cross-referenc[ing] each other's decisions when 
interpreting human rights norms',49 and are inspired by other courts' rationes 
decidendi, even if it is still highly debated which principles are shared by 
European countries.50 
An increased integrity and visibility of fundamental rights strengthens the 
predictability of the judgments of the European courts and increases 
coherency of interpretations of human rights standards. This is for the 
benefit of member states, as it limits the likelihood that an implementation 
of EU law would lead to an infringement of the ECHR. However, an 
increased integrity and visibility of fundamental rights is also an important 
advantage to individuals – especially asylum seekers – who can rely on 
interpretations by analogy, and on the CJEU's understanding of their rights. 
Therefore, in this article the CJEU judgments which underline the need to 
strengthen the establishment of a clear (well-justified and elaborated in the 
Court's decisions), balanced (taking into account interests of individuals, and 
of the member states), and coherent (taking into account not only EU 
secondary law but also the Charter, and the ECHR) European system of 
protection of human rights are called a "safe harbour". 
Derivations from common interpretation lines lead to confusion regarding 
the commonality of European human rights, especially if judgments are not 
based on well-reasoned rationes decidendi.51 This scenario may be called a 
"sinking ship" because it creates a risk to both states and individuals. Firstly, 
                                                 
47 More in Agnès G Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
48 Van Elsuwege (n 36) 215. 
49 Vasiliev (n 36) 372. 
50 According to Michael De Salvia ius commune europaeum is focused on: human 
dignity, legality, equality of arms and proportionality. Michael De Salvia (n 37) 555-
563. Others contested inclusion of the principle of equality to this list. Leino (n 41) 
460. 
51 Confront with Andreas Paulus, 'International Adjudication' in Samantha Besson 
and John Tasioulas (eds), The philosophy of international law (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 220. 
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diverting approaches can expose the EU member states – all of which are also 
state parties to the ECHR – to inconsistencies and uncertainties regarding 
the scope of their responsibilities under EU and international law. This could 
weaken the social acceptance of CJEU and ECtHR judgments, and increase 
tensions between the two courts.52 Secondly, individuals would have 
difficulties in understanding and, consequently, successfully claiming their 
rights in mutually incoherent European systems for the protection of human 
rights. Therefore, their feeling of alienation may be analogous to being on a 
sinking ship which is left on a swell of the sea of human rights law. Hence, in 
this article the metaphor a "sinking ship" relates to a complex "ocean" of 
responsibilities of states on the one hand, and a complicated – from an 
individual's point of view – process of identifying the applicable standard of 
protection of fundamental rights on the other hand. 
2. The Council of Europe's Standard 
Actions aimed at establishing a European system for the protection of human 
rights preceded the end of World War II.53 Scholars correctly claim that,  
from […][the] initial starting point, the CoE has developed one of the most 
advanced systems for the protection of human rights anywhere in the world. 
The […] system has a refined enforcement mechanism and is very effective.54 
The efficiency of the system has increased over time, especially since the 
ECtHR began to operate on a permanent basis.55 The ECtHR stressed early 
on that the Convention should be read in a way appropriate 'to realise the aim 
and achieve the object of the treaty'.56 This approach was accompanied by the 
                                                 
52 Harpaz (n 45) 122-123. 
53 Alastair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 2. 
54 Rhona KM Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (6th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2014) 97. The same conclusions were made by Bantekas and Oette 
(n 38) 221–222 and Vasiliev (n 36) 381. 
55 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established 
Thereby 1994 (ETS No 155). More in Mowbray (n 53) 14–18. 
56 Wemhoff v Germany App no 2122/64 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968), para 8. 
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development of the ECtHR's autonomous interpretation of ECHR rights.57 
The Strasbourg Court found that 'the Convention is a living instrument 
which […] must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions'.58 This 
is a clear indication that the ECtHR's aim is to ensure that the ECHR rights 
are not theoretical nor illusory, but practical and effective.59 
This dynamic interpretation has extended the scope of application of the 
Convention to 'an ever-widening range of contexts'.60 Hence, although the 
ECHR and its protocols do not contain a specific right to asylum, the ECtHR 
has nonetheless developed adequate safeguards in this regard,61 by stressing 
the absolute nature of the rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.62 
Other ECHR rights, especially the right to private and family life – Article 8 
– and the right to effective access to an appeal – Article 6 – go beyond the 
non-refoulement principle and substitute the Refugee Convention. 
3. The EU's Standard 
The European Economic Communities ('EEC') were initially established to 
strengthen the economic cooperation between its member states. However, 
a gradual expansion of the EEC's competences also increased the interest in 
                                                 
57 More in George Letsas, 'The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret 
the ECHR' (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 279. 
58 Tyrer v United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECtHR, 25 April 1978), para 31. 
59 Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECtHR, 9 October 1979). 
60 Alastair Mowbray, 'The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights' (2005) 
5 Human Rights Law Review 57, 58. Evolutive interpretation has been questioned 
by some States Parties to the ECHR. More in Fiona de Londras and Kanstantsin 
Dzehtsiarou, 'Managing Judicial Innovation in the European Court of Human 
Rights' (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 523, 523. 
61 Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2007) 311. 
62 It started with X v Belgium App no 984/61 (ECtHR, 19 May 1961), 6 Collection of 
Decisions, 39, 40. Compare with Samantha Velluti, Reforming the Common European 
Asylum System: Legislative Developments and Judicial Activism of the European Courts 
(Springer 2014) 79; Agnès G Hurwitz (n 47) 190–191. 
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protecting human rights at the EEC level.63 This was confirmed not only in 
the subsequent Treaties, but also in the decisions of the Court of Justice.64 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon65 in 2009 was a significant step 
towards protecting fundamental rights in the EU. As a result of the increase 
in the EU's functional powers, the protection of fundamental rights 
expanded into policy areas in which they were initially only incidentally 
regulated.66 The widening of the CJEU's jurisdiction further contributed to 
that process, as the Court did not refrain from a pro homine interpretation of 
EU law even during transition periods.67 However, to this day, the CJEU can 
only decide on issues which fall within the scope of EU law.68 
Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon made the CFREU legally binding, 
bringing the protection of fundamental rights to a new level.69 According to 
Article 6(1) TEU, the Charter has the same legal status as the Treaties. The 
Charter was drafted using plain language, which is used in order to increase 
the visibility of fundamental rights protected by EU legislation, and to define 
the current state of development of these rights. The Charter does not 
directly quote the ECHR, however it does refer to it.70 It is disputed whether 
                                                 
63 Smith (n 54) 112; Christian Franklin, 'The Legal Status of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon' (2010) 15 Tilburg Law Review 137, 
139; Harpaz (n 45) 107. 
64 Franklin (n 63) 148; Aidan O'Neill, 'The EU and Fundamental Rights – Part 1' (2011) 
16 Judicial Review 216, 216; Van Elsuwege (n 36) 196. 
65 Treaty on European Union [2007] OJ C306/1. 
66 Elise Muir, 'The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some 
Constitutional Challenges' (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 219, 226–227; 
Eleanor Spaventa, 'Should We "Harmonize” Fundamental Rights in the EU? Some 
Reflections about Minimum Standards and Fundamental Rights Protection in the 
EU Composite Constitutional System' [2018] Common Market Law Review 997, 
1000. 
67 Cf. Case C-19/08 Migrationsverket v Edgar Petrosian and Others EU:C:2009:41, and 
Case C-465/07 Elgafaji and Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justicie EU:C:2009:94. 
68 Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft 
EU:C:1989:321, [1989] ECR 02609. 
69 Spaventa (n 66) 1001; Muir (n 66) 219; Agnès G Hurwitz (n 47) 247. 
70 Andrzej Bisztyga, 'Europejska Konwencja Praw Człowieka a Karta Praw 
Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej – Stan Kompatybilności czy Konkurencyjności?' 
(2011) 3 Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 179, 186. 
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the Charter's aim is to complement the ECHR,71 or whether it guarantees a 
higher standard of protection.72 Official Explanations relating to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights provide little clarification and are not legally 
binding.73 
4. The EU versus the Council of Europe 
Article 6(2) TEU puts a time-unspecified obligation on the EU to accede to 
the ECHR. However, this accession shall not affect the Union's 
competences as defined in the Treaties. As a consequence, the CJEU has so 
far declared potential accession agreements to be incompatible with EU 
law.74 Moreover, Article 53 CFREU guarantees that the ECHR sets out a 
minimum standard of fundamental rights protection in the EU. However, as 
the Charter applies only to issues which are 'within the meaning and scope of 
EU law', the CJEU decides ad casum if this precondition is met.75 Still, it is 
unclear if 'the meaning and scope' refers to the set of rights enshrined in the 
Charter, or if it applies also to a certain standard of protection of those 
rights.76 The first option provides a possibility to rely on the Charter only if 
EU law directly refers to fundamental rights. This approach focuses on the 
mere existence of the Charter rights, but ignores the differences between the 
CFRUE and the ECHR regarding the content of these rights. Instead, the 
                                                 
71 Daniel Engel, Der Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur EMRK: vom defizitären 
Kooperationsverhältnis zum umfassenden EMRK-Rechtsschutz durch den EGMR? (Mohr 
Siebeck 2015) 24. 
72 Bożena Gronowska, 'The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights – Do We Really 
Need It?' in Justyna Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, European Union at the Crossroads: 
The Need for Constitutional and Economic Changes (TNOiK 2007) 137. 
73 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17. 
74 Opinion 2/94 on accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECR 1996 P-1783; Opinion 2/13 
EU:C:2014:2454. 
75 Francesca Ippolito, 'Migration and Asylum Cases before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Putting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to Test?' (2015) 
17 European Journal of Migration and Law 1, 2–4. The CJEU has been criticised for 
not finding the application of EU law in Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium, 
EU:C:2017:173. Evelien Brouwer, 'The European Court of Justice on Humanitarian 
Visas: Legal Integrity vs. Political Opportunism?' (2017) CEPS Commentary 3. 
76 Daniel Engel (n 71). 
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second view should be promoted because it increases the coherency of 
European systems of protection of human rights, thereby preventing 
potential conflicts between obligations stemming from the ECHR and EU 
law. As the EU has not yet acceded to the ECHR, member states would be 
the biggest beneficiaries of a strengthened ius commune europaeum, as it would 
mitigate the likelihood of repeating legal problems, such as those which arose 
in M.S.S.77 Currently, the ECHR and the Charter standards may vary, so 
states have to check if the application of proportional and reasonable 
restrictions imposed by EU law will not infringe the ECHR.78 However, this 
is not a systemic solution as it leaves discretion to national bodies regarding 
identification of the common understanding of these standards. 
Finally, the Strasbourg Court has developed the doctrine of equivalent 
protection which provides for the possibility of checking the conformity of 
the EU's actions with the ECHR.79 This was established despite the EU not 
being party to the Convention. The doctrine takes into account the 
peculiarities of EU law, including the principles of supremacy and direct 
effect, which makes it a reasonable compromise.80 The Strasbourg Court has 
stressed that the ECHR did not prohibit state parties from transferring their 
sovereign power to an international organization.81 However, such a transfer 
does not lift the human rights responsibilities of these states for the actions 
and omissions of their bodies under their international legal obligations. 
Therefore, even though the ECtHR have admitted that EU law generally 
ensures an equivalent protection of human rights, they have reserved a right 
to review if, in an individual case, a member state's actions are manifestly 
incoherent with the ECHR. 
                                                 
77 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011). 
78 Daniel Engel (n 71) 27; Agnès G Hurwitz (n 47) 249. 
79 Bosphorus v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005), paras 155–157. It was 
inspired by Solange II [1986] Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft 2 BvR 197/83. More in 
Elisa Ravasi, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ: A Comparative 
Analysis in Light of the Equivalency Doctrine (Brill 2017) 19–23. 
80 Ravasi (n 79) 38–39; Van Elsuwege (n 36) 206. 
81 Matthews v the United Kingdom App no 24833/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999) para 
32. 
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The doctrine of equivalent protection was challenged before the CJEU in the 
M.S.S. and N.S. cases.82 Nonetheless, the ECtHR has stuck to this standard 
and refrained from developing its own interpretation of EU law.83 However, 
it follows from the CJEU decision in Melloni84 that, in harmonised policy 
areas, national legislation cannot provide for a higher standard of protection 
of fundamental rights than that established by EU law, if this endangers the 
supremacy of EU law.85 A 'minimum standard' approach was not promoted in 
this judgment, leaving member states with contradictory interpretations of 
their international human rights obligations. However, the Court of Justice 
subsequently maintained an equivalent protection doctrine.86 National 
courts may also use the ECHR as a minimum standard if the CJEU finds that 
the case is not 'within the meaning and scope of EU law'.87 The ECtHR has 
already confirmed that it will not refrain from checking the equal protection 
standard in asylum cases.88 
5. Whose Standard? 
The EU is slowly adopting an increased focus on fundamental rights. This was 
facilitated when the Charter became legally binding and was given the same 
legal basis as the Treaties. Nonetheless, the EU has not established a holistic 
fundamental rights policy. The ECHR sets the minimum standard of 
protection for the EU, even though the EU is not party to the Convention. 
                                                 
82 Joined cases C-411/10 and C-439/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and ME and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform EU:C:2011:865. 
83 Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom App nos 8319/07 and 11449/07 (ECtHR, 28 
November 2011), paras 225–226. See references in Velluti (n 62) 88. 
84 Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal EU:C:2013:107. 
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International Law Journal 1097, 1121–1124. 
87 Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres 
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Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the CJEU sufficiently indicates in its 
decisions the importance of ensuring consistency of application between the 
rights envisaged in the ECHR and in the Charter.89 
The ECtHR can decide on all issues within state jurisdiction and, as such, it 
is a fully-fledged human rights court. The Court of Justice, on the other hand, 
can only refer to or uphold fundamental rights if the circumstances fall within 
the scope of EU law. As the EU regulates fundamental rights only 
incidentally, the CJEU is more restricted in securing these rights than the 
ECtHR.90 
The Refugee Convention forms the basis of the CEAS. The importance of 
the Refugee Convention was underlined by Article 78(1) TFEU, Article 18(2) 
CFREU, and EU legislation building the CEAS. The CJEU was 'the first 
international court actually interpreting the Refugee Convention'.91 This 
raised expectations that the Court of Justice 'would boost international 
refugee law',92 as the CJEU's progressive interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention could be an inspiration to other non-EU legal systems. This 
establishes a "safe harbour". 
As such, the most prominent advantages of the CoE's system of protecting 
human rights include the ECtHR's extensive experience in human rights law 
and its wide jurisdiction. The Strasbourg system is more holistic and the 
ECHR represents a minimal standard for the EU. Due to 'the living 
instrument doctrine', the ECHR is continuously developed and adapted to 
meet the current needs of European societies. However, this doctrine applies 
only when a general trend in the CoE is found, which limits accusations of 
judicial activism of the ECtHR. 
                                                 
89 Currently there are no self-contained (closed) regimes, but some specialised 
regimes are increasingly independent from general international law. Ewelina Cała-
Wacinkiewicz, Fragmentacja prawa międzynarodowego (Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck 
2018) 386–392. 
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IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CJEU'S JUDGMENTS 
1. Increased Recognition of the Right to Effective Remedy in Dublin Cases 
The Dublin III Regulation has significantly increased the procedural 
safeguards in asylum law without prioritising the speediness of the Dublin 
procedure over the right of the individual to judicial scrutiny.93 This was 
stressed in Ghezelbash, in which the CJEU underlined that fundamental rights 
are not limited to 'systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the 
reception conditions for asylum seekers',94 as this interpretation would 
deprive other rights of any practical effect.95 This was an important 
development, particularly when compared to the judgment in the N.S case. 
In Ghezelbash, the CJEU stressed that an applicant can ask for a verification 
that the Dublin criteria were applied correctly to his or her case, but the 
decision responding to this request 'could have no bearing on the principle of 
mutual trust'.96 However, this does not amount to a right to choose the 
country in which the asylum application is processed. 
Ghezelbash can unquestionably be identified as creating a "safe harbour" as it 
stresses the importance of fundamental rights in the Dublin procedure. At 
the same time, the Court weighted the above-described pro homine 
interpretation of EU law against the interests of the member states by 
stressing that the right to judicial scrutiny cannot be understood as a right to 
choose the country of asylum. This balanced – and hence, compromised – 
approach increased the practicality of the CJEU judgment. The same 
purpose is achieved by the Court's indication that the right to judicial 
scrutiny applies not only in case of systemic flaws as in most cases this kind of 
flaws are not identified. 
                                                 
93 More in Heijer (n 9) 859–860. 
94 Ghezelbash (n 9) para 37. Limitations of the right to judicial remedy to systemic 
deficiencies were criticised by Isiksel (n 90) 586 and Hemme Battjes and Evelien 
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In Ghezelbash, the CJEU did not specify which Dublin criteria may be 
contested by applicants. These issues were, however, addressed in Karim.97 
The Court explained that the national court has the right to verify the 
duration of absences of the asylum seeker from the EU.98 Karim can be 
classified as contributing to a "safe harbour" as the ruling ensures the 
coherence of the CJEU's interpretation of the right to judicial remedy with 
its earlier decisions in M.S.S. and N.S.99 The Court indicated that the Dublin 
criteria may be questioned by the applicant, and a national court must be able 
to verify substantive aspects of the applicant's claims. Yet, a national court's 
decision in an individual case cannot be understood as an attempt to question 
the mutual trust. 
This gradually increasing recognition of the right to an effective remedy was 
affirmed in A.S.100 The Court of Justice stressed that an applicant may claim 
improprieties in an individual Dublin transfer due to a late submission of the 
transfer decision.101 This finding also applies in cases of illegal border-
crossing when the transfers were accepted by the receiving country.102 This 
increases the practical relevance of the A.S. decision since many applications 
are submitted in similar circumstances. The six-month period for a transfer 
should be calculated from the moment when the final appeal decision is 
made. This interpretation contributes to the effet utile because a submission 
of an appeal suspends the transfer. In times of a migration crisis, a judgment 
upholding another Dublin criterion, which can be relied upon by an applicant 
who has illegally crossed the border, is a useful clarification. Thus, it is clear 
that A.S. creates a "safe harbour". 
The strengthening of the applicants' right to an effective remedy continued 
in the decision in C.K., H.F., A.S. Here the Court of Justice held that the 
applicants could present objective evidence of serious medical constraints to 
a Dublin transfer before national courts, and that the courts must then decide 
                                                 
97 Karim (n 9); Heijer (n 9) 865. 
98 Karim (n 9), paras 26-27. Dublin responsibilities cease when the receiving country 
will establish that the asylum seeker left the EU for more than three months. Heijer 
(n 9) 865. 
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if the applicants' rights under Article 4 CFREU and Article 3 ECHR would 
be infringed if transfers were made.103 This applies even when the asylum 
system of the destination country is not affected by any systemic deficiencies. 
This ruling is in line with M.S.S. (although this judgment was not cited by the 
CJEU) as systemic deficiencies should preclude all transfers ad abstractum. A 
reference to the ECtHR's decision in Paposhvili104 increases the coherence 
between the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR. Consequently, the 
CJEU's reasoning in C.K., H.F., A.S. contributes to the creation of a "safe 
harbour" as it reflects the ECtHR's level of protection and it is not limited to 
the systemic deficiencies of the destination country's asylum system. 
The CJEU case law established in Ghezelbash and Karim was further 
developed in Mengesteab,105 where the Court of Justice focused on the 
timeframe in which the request to take charge of an applicant should be 
made. It concluded that time limits 'contribute, in the same way as the 
criteria set out in Chapter III [of the Dublin III Regulation] […], to 
determining the responsible Member State'.106 Those deadlines can be 
invoked to question the proper implementation of the above-mentioned 
Regulation. Thus, the CJEU identified another factor, additional to those 
developed in Karim and A.S., which can be raised during the judicial review. 
The Court also underlined that the receiving state's actions do not legalise 
the transfer if the Dublin III Regulation deadlines have been exceeded, 
thereby creating a "safe harbour". 
The CJEU stressed, furthermore, that the decision of which state should be 
responsible for handling the asylum case should be initiated as soon as 
possible.107 This does not necessarily signal the priority given to the 
speediness of the Dublin procedure, because it facilitates, inter alia, the 
search for family members of unaccompanied minors108 and shortens the 
detention period. Regrettably, in Mengesteab, the CJEU did not address the 
                                                 
103 C.K., H.F., A.S. (n 14), paras 75 and 90. 
104 Paposhvili v Belgium App no 41738/10 (ECtHR 13 December 2016). 
105 Mengesteab (n 29) paras 46–48. 
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need to ensure the best interests of the child, even though it is clearly 
established in the Charter and CEAS. It also did not indicate that deprivation 
of liberty should be as short as possible. This suggests that the Court still 
focuses on EU integration, only reluctantly referring to the coherence of 
protection of fundamental rights, thus contributing more to a "sinking ship" 
situation. Owing to these deficiencies, it is difficult to classify Mengesteab as 
contributing either to the creation of a "safe harbour" or facilitating a 
"sinking ship". 
The Dublin III Regulation does not set up objective preconditions for the 
limitation of liberty. Instead, it refers to Directive 2013/33 and Article 6 
CFREU. Directive 2013/33 sets a higher standard than the ECHR because the 
Convention does not require a test of the efficiency of less coercive measures 
and of the existence of a risk of fleeing.109 Nevertheless, the ECtHR 
judgment in Del Rio Prada v Spain110 was referred to by the CJEU in Al 
Chodor111 to find that any limitation to the right to liberty and security must 
be provided for by general law. Such law must be of a certain quality, 
sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application; a consistent 
administrative practice does not meet that standard.112 This finding increases 
the rule of law, and Al Chodor thus contributes to the ius commune europaeum 
because the CJEU specified that limitations to freedoms enshrined in the 
Charter have to be precisely defined by law, including by EU secondary 
legislation which has direct effect. This clarification applies to the right to 
asylum, but also to other rights envisaged by the Charter.  
As the competencies of the EU are growing, member states are increasingly 
often, as Article 51(1) of the Charter puts it, 'implementing Union law'. 
Therefore, more and more frequently countries will have to decide to what 
extent they can limit the rights guaranteed by the CFREU. Consequently, 
the likelihood that the Charter's standard will not be applied correctly by 
                                                 
109 Opinion of Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-528/15 Policie 
ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké policie v Salah Al Chodor, 
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112 Ibid, para 38-45. An increase in guarantees regarding detention in Dublin 
procedures was noted by Sánchez (n 7) 112. 
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member states is increasing. Hence, Al Chodor (which refers to the standard 
of law which limits freedoms envisaged in the Charter) will most likely be 
cited in other future CJEU judgments, also those focusing on other EU 
policies. Finally, the efficiency test could also be 'a source of inspiration' for 
the ECtHR in its future decision as it has already been criticised for not 
applying this test.113 Al Chodor therefore clearly establishes a "safe harbour". 
Tensions between the efficiency of EU law and the rights of asylum seekers 
lay at the heart of the decision in Amayry. The Dublin III transfer is 
suspended if the applicant asks for a judicial review of the Dublin decision. If 
that request is submitted after several weeks in detention, the deprivation of 
liberty is continuous and its total length may exceed the six-week period, 
which is, 'in principle, sufficient'.114 A contrary view would put states which 
have introduced an automatic suspending effect of an appeal in a less 
favourable situation than those which have not introduced such a measure. It 
would also sacrifice judicial protection to the speediness of the Dublin 
mechanism. Moreover, the Court of Justice stressed that a detention of two 
months may not be overly excessive, but a three to twelve-month long 
deprivation of liberty is disproportionate.115 This clarification is an important 
contribution to the ius commune europaeum because EU law, in that respect, is 
more specific than the ECHR. Hence, Amayry increases the fairness and 
predictability of rules on the deprivation of liberty, thereby contributing to a 
"safe harbour". Regrettably, a need to guarantee an individual case 
assessment and the national courts' supervision of the detention was only 
referred to in the context of longer periods of detention.116 Moreover, 
considerations regarding the link between the duration and objective of the 
deprivation of liberty are missing references to the principle of 
proportionality and the ECtHR judgments, thereby forming part of a 
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"sinking ship".117 Despite these drawbacks, however, Amayry can be 
categorised as establishing a "safe harbour". 
2. Combating Abuses of Asylum Procedures 
According to statistical data some asylum seekers misuse asylum procedures, 
for example by submitting unfounded and subsequent applications.118 To 
combat an overuse of refugee procedures, states may be tempted to sacrifice 
the rights of asylum seekers, especially the right to judicial remedy as it 
prolongs refugee status determination procedures. 
These constraints were addressed in Tall, in which the CJEU clarified that 
the right to judicial remedy also covers the right to contest 'a decision not to 
further examine a subsequent application', even if it is followed by a return 
decision.119 Nevertheless, it would be disproportionate to oblige member 
states to fully re-examine cases when no new evidence or arguments were 
found in the preliminary examination of the renewed application. The 
decision in Tall can therefore be considered a helping hand to countries 
which struggle with the overuse of asylum systems, as they can refrain from 
re-examining renewed applications. It also ensures a fair balance between the 
right to judicial scrutiny and the efficiency of asylum procedures, because 
prior to the delivery of this judgment subsequent applications were processed 
in accelerated procedures in which the applicants' rights were limited.120 
Owing to these reasons, Tall can be classified as creating a "safe harbour". 
Similar constraints were addressed in M.  EU legislation guarantees the right 
to a hearing in subsidiary protection cases, only if national law stipulates that 
an application is analysed as a request for asylum and, if a refugee status is 
denied, as a request for a subsidiary protection.121 Nevertheless, this right 
should also be provided when a single procedure is not implemented. In that 
context, EU law will not apply directly. Still, rights conferred by EU law have 
to be effectively protected by domestic legislation, as the member states will 
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clearly be acting within the scope of EU law when they implement, enforce, 
or interpret EU secondary legislation.122 This explains why M. contributes to 
a common understanding of the concept of 'acting within the scope of EU 
law' which applies also to other EU policies. For these reasons, M. 
contributes to the creation of a "safe harbour". 
The possibility of limiting the right to an interview in an appeal was 
confirmed in Mousa Sacko.123 Nevertheless, this restriction must respect 
guarantees established in Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR. An appeal court or 
tribunal 'must be able to review the merits of the reasons which led the 
competent administrative authority to find that the application for 
international protection was unfounded or made in bad faith'.124 Due to a 
close link between first instance and appeal proceedings, applicants may be 
denied a hearing on appeal, if the 'information contained in the 
administrative file in the proceedings at first instance' is sufficient.125 That 
view seems to balance the fairness of the asylum procedure with its 
speediness. It is also in line with a literal interpretation of Directive 2013/32, 
which does not guarantee access to an interview in an appeal procedure. At 
the same time, references to the ECHR's standard provide adequate 
guarantees of protection of the applicants' rights. As such, Mousa Sacko is also 
part of the establishment of a "safe harbour". 
In Daher Muse Ahmed, the CJEU concluded that a decision on the 
inadmissibility of an asylum application should be issued to an applicant who 
had been granted subsidiary protection by another member state.126 Hence, 
applicants should submit their asylum claims in the first secure country. Some 
scholars support such an interpretation,127 whereas others claim that this 
limitation is not explicitly provided for by the Refugee Convention.128 As 
such, clarifications from the CJEU have contributed to a ius commune 
europaeum and the establishment of a "safe harbour". However, they were not 
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sufficiently justified and lacked references to the Refugee Convention, the 
ECtHR's judgments, and the Charter, thereby contributing to a "sinking 
ship" scenario. Daher Muse Ahmed therefore cannot easily be classified either 
as establishing a "safe harbour" or contributing to a "sinking ship". 
3. Application of the 'Safe Country Concept' 
The Court of Justice has been alleged by member states of increasing the 
protection of fundamental rights beyond the wording of EU Treaty 
provisions by defining EU standards in areas which were deliberately not 
regulated by EU law-makers or in which EU legislation was insufficiently 
precise and clear.129 In other words, states have been accusing the CJEU of 
excessively favouring the rights of individuals over the state's sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to say that the Court has always opted 
for a pro homine interpretation of EU law.130 Evidence for this can be found in 
cases focusing on, for example, the 'safe country concept'.131 
In Mirza, the CJEU upheld the transfer of the applicant to the country in 
which his asylum claim would be presumed to be inadmissible, on the grounds 
that he had travelled via a safe country.132 A contrary interpretation could 
introduce a new exception to the general rule. It could also encourage 
migrants to continue their journey without waiting for the asylum decision 
issued by the first safe country, which would overburden destination 
countries and be contrary to the foundations of the CEAS. This part of Mirza 
does not raise doubts regarding compliance with fundamental rights. The 
same cannot be said about the release of the transit country of its obligation 
to provide the sending country with extracts from national law concerning 
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the concept of 'a safe country'.133 The laws and practices of member states as 
regards this concept vary.134 Nevertheless, the CJEU unquestionably 
favoured mutual trust over a duty to ensure that the Dublin transfer would 
not result in the automatic removal to a country which is presumed to be safe. 
This raises questions regarding Mirza's coherence with M.S.S.135 As the 
concept of 'a safe country' is also applied by non-EU countries, Mirza may 
encourage them to favour unconditional mutual trust, thereby contributing 
to a "sinking ship" scenario. 
Jafari is another example of a pro integratione judgment, as the CJEU 
concluded that if a country has tolerated the entry of an individual into its 
territory (also as a result of an avoidance of border controls), it could not 
escape Dublin responsibilities, because the Schengen Border Code, 
Directive 2001/55 and Article 78(3) TFEU, provide mechanisms which could 
mitigate the migration crisis.136 Regrettably, the CJEU did not address the 
fact that these measures do not help transit countries to stop secondary 
movements of large numbers of asylum seekers efficiently. Therefore, Jafari 
neither ensured the effet utile of EU law, nor safeguarded satisfactory 
reception standards. It can thus be classified as contributing to a "sinking 
ship" scenario. 
These deficiencies were addressed in A.S., in which the CJEU extensively 
cited Jafari, but softened its line of interpretation. The transit country is 
responsible for processing asylum claims if this does not expose the 
applicants to a real risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment.137 
Regrettably, in A.S., the Court did not specify whether such a risk should be 
identified ad casum or in abstracto. The CJEU complicated its answer to this 
question by citing in the same paragraph both an individualised risk and a risk 
existing in EU member states.138 Hence, A.S. can also be considered as 
creating a "sinking ship" situation. 
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V. "SAFE HARBOUR" OR "SINKING SHIP"? 
1. Functional Interpretation of EU Law in Asylum Cases 
Interpretation of EU law can be difficult due to differences in language 
versions of the EU legislative acts. A comparative analysis of the different 
language versions may also be insufficient.139 Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the context of EU law and the objectives pursued by the rules which 
a specific provision is part of.140 Thus, the CJEU have repeatedly examined 
the objectives of the Dublin III Regulation141 and the CEAS.142 
In Fransson, EU fundamental rights were cited to give effect to EU rules, even 
though the EU legislation which was at the heart of this case left a certain 
level of discretion to the member states.143 Some scholars supported this view 
and explained that 'the scope of EU law should be understood more broadly 
whenever this is a pre-condition for emphasising fundamental rights 
protection throughout the European Union'.144 This approach should be 
applied especially 'when it presents even a partial connection with EU law'.145 
These opinions should be praised because the Charter has increased the 
visibility of fundamental rights in the EU.146 Moreover, Article 51(1) of the 
Charter supports the CJEU in promoting fundamental rights,147 making the 
Court co-responsible for building the ius commune europaeum. A broad 
understanding of a term 'within the scope of EU law' would therefore 
strengthen the EU integration process, thus establishing a "safe harbour". 
However, a functional interpretation, which has already caused fundamental 
rights to spill over into areas which were not initially covered by EU law,148 
may cause concern among member states which would rather opt for slower 
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EU integration. They may accuse the EU institutions of trying 'to claim 
competence which the Treaties did not confer on the EU',149 especially as 'a 
purely functional power to lay down rules on human rights [in asylum policy] 
[…] may be most meaningful'.150 Hence, a functional interpretation may 
hamper amendments to EU law.151 Nevertheless, the CJEU should not avoid 
this interpretation, especially as 'the Charter project […] may be understood 
as an attempt at limiting the CJEU['s judicial activism]'.152 
2. Limited Explanations to CJEU's Judgments 
To refrain from becoming involved in national disputes, the Court of Justice 
avoids giving concrete answers to preliminary questions and instead provides 
limited rationes decidendi.153 Thus, it leaves 'the final balancing to the referring 
[national] court'.154 However, this makes judgments abstract and difficult to 
implement.155 This may explain why some preliminary questions are 
repeatedly referred to the CJEU. 
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An example which supports this theory is J.N. This judgment develops the 
previous Arslan decision,156 even though it is not explicitly cited in J.N. In 
Arslan, the CJEU had upheld the detention of an applicant who submitted 
one application for asylum during a return procedure. In J.N., this 
interpretation was expanded to include repeated asylum claims. In both 
cases, detention served the 'purpose of expulsion', because 'an eventual 
rejection of that application may open the way to the enforcement of removal 
orders that have already been made'.157 The deprivation of liberty should be 
imposed only after assessing if 'individual conduct represents a serious threat 
to public policy, public security, or national security'.158 This view has been 
expressed in a context of applications which are frequently rejected because 
they are submitted only to delay the return. The Court of Justice correctly 
concluded that the return procedure must be continued at the stage at which 
it was suspended by a submission of the asylum application.159 It clarified the 
EU's interpretation of the term 'purpose of expulsion', ensuring that it was in 
line with the ECtHR's judgments. Thus, J.N. contributes to the creation of a 
"safe harbour". It is likely that the decision will be cited in subsequent 
judgments. 
The avoidance of the Court of Justice to provide straightforward answers to 
preliminary questions can also be perceived as a confirmation of the view that 
'the CJEU's main focus seems to be on ensuring the acceptability of its 
judgments for the national courts of the Member States'.160 Examples 
supporting the latter statement can be found in A.S. and in paragraph 55 of 
Jafari. The CJEU stressed that the Dublin III Regulation applies when 
countries tolerated an entry by an individual, because EU law provides 
exceptional mechanisms which then apply.161 However, this approach can be 
called a "sinking ship" as the inefficiency of those measures resulted in 
overburdening the countries in question. 
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3. Building an Ius Commune Europaeum? 
The CJEU is limited to interpret issues which have been brought by the 
national referring courts, which is a major challenge to developing a holistic 
perception of fundamental rights.162 However, an internal referencing system 
(when the CJEU cites its own judgments), as evidenced in cases M.163 and 
A.S.,164 as well as cases which refer to Ghezelbash165 and Al Chodor,166 develop a 
comprehensive approach to fundamental rights in asylum policy. Moreover, 
the harmonisation clause (also known as a coherence clause),167 which is 
provided for in Article 52(3) of the Charter, confirms that the ECHR defines 
a minimal standard of respect of fundamental rights. Thus, some scholars 
claim that it should be compulsory for the CJEU to refer to ECtHR 
judgments, because the ECtHR is the only body legally empowered to 
interpret the ECHR.168 Nevertheless, others recall that the framers of the 
Charter did not intend to impose such an obligation on the Court of 
Justice.169 The latter view is implicitly supported by the CJEU as it only very 
inconsistently cites the ECHR and the ECtHR's judgments. 
This research also confirms that the Court of Justice only reluctantly refers 
to the Refugee Convention in its decisions.170 The Refugee Convention 
forms an essential part of the argument only in the Warendorf decision, in 
which the Court of Justice held that Directive 2011/95 must be read 'in a 
manner consistent with the […][Refugee] Convention and the other relevant 
treaties referred to in Article 78(1) TFEU [and with] the Charter'.171 Thus, the 
Refugee Convention applies to the right of freedom of movement, because 
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under EU law the rights and benefits of refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection should be equal. These rights must also be exercised 
under the same conditions and restrictions as those provided for other 
foreigners who are legally resident in the member state which has granted 
them protection. 
Moreover, in Lounani, the Court of Justice cited the 1945 Charter of the 
United Nations, the Refugee Convention, the resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council, and addressed the facts of the case. It concluded 
that an exclusion clause may also be applied to applicants who were not 
convicted of widely interpreted terrorist offences, even if it has been 
established that neither the leaders of a terrorist group, nor their 
subordinates, have committed terrorist attacks.172 Lounani is therefore an 
important contribution to the ius commune europaeum, owing to a well-
reasoned ratio decidendi and a clearly established link between EU law and UN 
agreements. It also proves that the CJEU can refrain from highlighting the 
distinctiveness of EU law from international law.173 Thus, Lounani can be 
called a "safe harbour". 
In cases focusing on Articles 2, 4 and 6 of the Charter, the CJEU has referred 
to Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the ECHR and followed the ECtHR's judgments. In 
most CJEU judgments, the Refugee Convention and the ECHR were only a 
point of reference. Therefore, the interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
still remains primarily in the hands of national courts.174 Hence, this research 
confirms other scholars' findings that the CJEU has 'limited itself to dealing 
with the EU law provisions in the sense of a self-contained regime',175 
although the term 'specialised regime' may be more adequate in this context. 
This interpretation is supported by Article 51(1) of the Charter. 
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Nevertheless, the ECHR has played an important role in CJEU judgments on 
the detention of asylum seekers.176 Article 5 ECHR was referred to in order 
to indicate limitations which may be legitimately imposed on the exercise of 
the rights laid down in Article 6 CFREU.177 The ECtHR's judgments were 
referred to in paragraph 38 of Al Chodor, thus creating a "safe harbour". 
However, in K., the Court of Justice briefly explained that 'detention […] [is 
not precluded], provided that such a measure is lawful and implemented in 
accordance with the objective of protecting the individual from 
arbitrariness'.178 This is an important clarification of the legitimacy of 
detention for the purpose of, inter alia, establishing identity and nationality – 
an issue essential for all member states struggling with the migration crisis. 
Regrettably, the CJEU has refrained from any further in-depth elaborations 
and missed the opportunity to develop a ius commune europaeum, contributing 
thereby to the "sinking ship" scenario. 
In most of the cases analysed in this article, the CJEU did not provide 
extensive reasoning on the level of protection of rights provided for in the 
Charter. However, in paragraphs 30-33 of M., the CJEU scrutinised the right 
to be heard and, in paragraph 32 of Moussa Sacko, it analysed the right to an 
effective legal remedy. Finally, in C.K., H.F., A.S., the judges recalled the 
absolute nature of the right covered by Article 4 of the Charter and linked its 
application to human dignity (Article 1 of the Charter). 
The EU has not established a comprehensive fundamental rights policy. 
Thus, the CJEU should continuously increase the visibility of these rights by 
emphasising their importance. It should therefore 'rely on the Strasbourg 
Regime and on the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court in a more explicit, 
coherent, systemic, integrative and comprehensive manner'.179 This would 
strengthen the coherence between the CJEU and the ECtHR's judgments 
and, consequently, also their predictability. References to the CoE's regime 
would demonstrate the willingness of the Court of Justice to continue the 
judicial dialogue with the ECtHR.180 This could be an incentive for the 
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ECtHR to also refer to the CJEU's judgments. Increased mutual respect 
between these two courts would furthermore strengthen a feeling of a co-
responsibility for development of the ius commune europaeum. 
Moreover, references to international law, in particular to developments in 
the UN and the CoE, could increase the legitimacy and authority of the 
CJEU. In that way, the Court of Justice could 'promote […] [a] higher level of 
compliance with its verdicts'.181 That could also increase the social 
acceptance of the CJEU's judgments, as it would 'assist […] [the Court in] 
striking the delicate equilibrium between national, regional and universal 
protection of human rights within the EU'.182 Thus, a well-justified obiter dicta 
explaining the relationship between international law and EU law could 
become the CJEU's contribution to the ius commune europaeum. 
Regrettably, references like those outlined above were rarely made in the 
analysed CJEU judgments. Al Chodor, K., and Amayry confirm previous 
findings that the CJEU has not developed a systematic methodology and 
consistent practice of referring to the ECtHR's jurisprudence.183 Some 
scholars perceive this as an attempt by the Court of Justice to keep a 
monopoly over the interpretation of EU law.184 This, however, seems a too 
far-reaching statement, as the CJEU is not explicitly obliged to cite the 
ECHR. 
The CJEU is more likely to refer to the Charter than to the ECHR. 
References to Articles 4, 18, 34, 45, and - more frequently – Article 47 of the 
Charter have served 'as a "yardstick" for the protection of fundamental rights 
in the European Union [and the Court] was also (though not always) capable 
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of determining a sometimes "progressive" interpretation of human rights'.185 
This can be seen in the decisions in Tall, K., Ghezelbash and in Moussa Sacko. 
Rare references to the ECHR could also signal that the CJEU tries to avoid 
conflicts with the ECtHR, since the Court of Justice refers to ECHR only 
when the issue at stake has already been analysed by the ECtHR.186 The 
CJEU could use this approach to its advantage. This would, however, require 
the Court of Justice to stress that it is primarily focused on the interpretation 
of the Charter, and that the ECHR is used simply as a minimum standard. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Unprecedented migratory pressure has put the CEAS to the test. It has also 
revealed loopholes in EU member states' national laws and practices. The 
decisions of the Court of Justice between 1 January 2015 and 15 September 
2017 on the rights of asylum seekers have focused on the application of the 
Dublin III Regulation and Directive 2013/32. We should especially praise the 
Court's views on a need to ensure the efficiency of the right to judicial 
scrutiny, and on a tolerated entry of individuals. Reflections on the transit of 
foreigners who intended to submit their applications for asylum in another 
member state, and on the conflict between, on the one hand, the right to 
judicial scrutiny for a decision on a Dublin transfer and, on the other, the 
need to ensure a speedy execution of the Dublin procedure are also valuable 
clarifications of EU law. Ghezelbash has already been recognised as a milestone 
in the development of the rights of asylum seekers, but Al Chodor and Jafari 
will most likely become similar cornerstones of the EU asylum policy. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU's deliberations on the fundamental rights of asylum 
seekers cannot unambiguously be classified as either creating a "safe harbour" 
or contributing to a "sinking ship". This is because, in some cases, the Court 
of Justice has supported the need to respect the fundamental rights of the 
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applicants, whereas in others it relied on the functional approach to evade 
making a reference to these rights. 
The analysis in this article confirms that the CJEU is gradually strengthening 
the protection of fundamental rights of asylum seekers in the EU. In 
Ghezelbash, the Court underlined this approach by stressing a limited use of 
reasons which can be invoked by asylum applicants to ask for a judicial 
scrutiny of the decisions on their transfer. That list of exceptional reasons 
was expanded in Karim and new exceptions were exemplified in A.S., 
Mengesteab, C.K., H.F., A.S., and Al Chodor. In M., and Mousa Sacko the CJEU 
limited the right to a hearing, but ensured the respect for the fundamental 
rights of the applicants. Those explanations can unquestionably be called a 
"safe harbour". 
References to the Charter in the CJEU judgments confirm that 'the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty has marked a new era for European Union 
involvement in fundamental rights matters',187 indicating that the Charter has 
contributed to establishing a "safe harbour" in the EU. On the other hand, 
the practice of making references to the CFREU has not yet become routine. 
They are more frequent in less controversial matters, but even in those cases 
they are not extensively elaborated on. Thus, the CJEU's judgments do not 
provide thorough clarifications regarding a correlation between the rights 
enshrined in the CFREU and those in the ECHR. This is a missed 
opportunity for the development of a ius commune europaeum, a project that 
would increase the coherence of human rights protection across Europe and, 
consequently, the efficiency of protection of those rights. Therefore, it is 
legitimate to say that in some cases the Court of Justice has sacrificed 
fundamental rights protection in order to deepen the EU integration process, 
thereby contributing to the "sinking ship" circumstances. 
However, the CJEU has also gradually opened up a dialogue with the ECtHR 
by referring not only to the ECHR but also to the ECtHR case law, 
consequently creating a "safe harbour". This furthers the development of the 
ius commune europaeum. Nevertheless, the CJEU is far from having established 
a consistent methodology of citing the ECtHR's judgments, lending support 
to the "sinking ship" scenario. 
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